"The Name of the Game was Whoop-Ass!"

Lt. General John Sattler uttered this most memorable quote during The Future of Iraq: Fighting an Insurgency While Building a Nation event at the American Enterprise Institute. General Sattler, commander of the First Marine Expeditionary Force, was the first speaker.

Part I: Introduction

This was my third visit to the AEI; I never did blog a report of my second visit, Raymond Aron and the End of Europe. Excuse me, I have a job, and can't spend all my time writing.

Nevertheless, once again this intrepid blogger, Solomon2, traded his pajamas for a business suit to attend a think-tank meeting of interest. Solomon2 braved near-100°F weather in his air-conditioned car, making wrong turns and arriving late.

That means I missed the introduction, the first few minutes, and the usual pre-meeting schmooze and evaluation of the audience - for one of the purposes of my blog is to add "flavor" to what is missed in the event transcripts and videos, and what it is like to experience such events. But better late than never! The sources for this account are my notes and memory; in a few days, the video and transcript should be available from the AEI. Rather than use them to correct my account, I urge my readers to compare it with the recordings, to better understand the sorts of errors that can creep into casual reporting.

At first glance, the conference room was packed - there were chairs for perhaps 150 people - but I occupied one of several seats still available. Some people chose to stand because they were still picking at the snack tables: I spotted soda, bottled water, and Campbell's vegetable juice among the remaining items.

Some of the audience yielded to the weather and had donned casual clothes, though nobody in the crowd of a hundred or so wore shorts. Only the Al-Hurra cameraman wore jeans.

The most sensibly dressed were the military officers at the lecture table; they chose to wear their desert-camo BDUs rather than dress uniforms. General Sattler's uniform was a standard pattern, but Colonel Anderson's uniform sported a computer-printed pattern I had never seen before, perhaps a design tailored for the urban areas, olive groves, and date palms of Iraq.

As I whipped out my notebook, General Sattler was describing last autumn's security situation in Iraq. Like every committed soldier, the more the general described a battle, the more animated he became:

Part II: Satter's Speech

Sattler: ...train and mentor Iraqis for operational security. Intimidation keeps the economy aground...

...wiping out the Sadr revolt. A combined force of Americans and Iraqis [did it] as Iraqis couldn't do it [alone]...Sadr has been marginalized...hardly any supply-route attacks.

The "Falluja brigade" couldn't [uphold] the law...[Iraqis attach loyalty to] their family first, tribe second, and cronies third. Even those who had lived in the West [fitted] into this...

The second Fallujah fight used soldiers from outside. Allawi made the call. Stuff exported out of Fallujah made it a terror training town: a newly-arrived insurgent could go in and be fully trained and equipped upon departure.

This was as joint as a fight can be: 45,000 troops, 8,000 U.S. soldiers, Army troops under Marine command including 6 Iraqi battalions, 2,500 sailors, 2,500 airmen. Army and Marine foward air controllers directed carrier attack bombers.

The Marines needed heavy armor for the battle, so we called in the Army especially to seal the roads out of the city. General Tom Metz commanded.

"The Name of the Game was Whoop-Ass!" There was no indiscriminate bombing. The city is 3x3 mile area.

Reconstruction: city open December 23rd, with control points everywhere. There are now 150,000 inhabitants vs. 400 when the city was captured. Most of the population left before the battle, part of a psy-ops campaign to reduce civilian casualties.

Some big fish left before the battle, but the remainder was very tenacious. Twenty thousand buildings in the city, all cleared at least three times. Troops "found a lot of really sick stuff..."

"Did we break the back of the insurgency? I know we did there." Took out the thugs and their instructors.

I have a half-hour for questions.

Mike ----, Defense Threat Reduction Agency: I was a Marine at the battle of Nasiriyah ---

Sattler: Hoorah!

Mike ----: and I think we'll see more of Sadr. Any mistakes at the tactical level? ...Phase 4B.

[Phase 4B is jargon that refers to the "sustainment" of a soldier or Marine after he leaves the active ranks of the Corps. That is to say: once a Marine, always a Marine!]

Sattler: The tactical lessons were constant, adaptability great, tactics change day-to-day, on-the-spot...This is "adapt-and-win".

My personal lesson: Don't tell people you'll rebuild and then [do nothing] because you don't have the money - can turn tactical win into strategic loss! Finally rebuilding did happen with adjudicated claims. [Fallujans] could move or rebuild [out of a $100 million fund].

[There was something special to the exchange between the General and the ex-Marine. This was not quite the exchange between a commander and a subordinate, or even a former subordinate. There was no rancor in their dispute and I could witness their mutual admiration. This was more like the relationship between two members of the same lodge: they shared the same ideals and goals, and each was satisfied with their relationship to the other. In other words, the Marine Experience was an intense and brotherly association between free men. Hoo-rah!]

Donnelly: That's all the time available for this speaker.

Sattler: I'll be available outside.

[The analyst next to me muttered that this sounded like "Vietnam all over again". "Was that criticism or praise?" I replied.]

[General Sattler stepped outside. The moderator, Mr. Thomas Donnelly, then convened the discussion panel.]

Part III: The Discussion Panel

Frederick Kagan, AEI resident defense & security scholar: "In Iraq there is good news and bad news".

The Vietnam Comparison: Iraq is nothing like Vietnam. We are in an excellent military position vs. the insurgents; they cannot do large-scale attacks upon our soldiers. A better comparison is Northern Ireland...

[At first I mentally sniffed at the comparison, then I realized Kagan is at least partially correct. The terrorism in Iraq is more intense and sustained than most of the Communist-inspired terrorism of the Cold War, yet less intense than the Vietcong-style battles of Southeast Asia. Left unmentioned, however, was the most apt comparison: Israel's 2001-2003 battle against suicide bombers, culminating in the much-misrepresented Battle of Jenin.]

Also, there is very little wide-spread support for attacks against Americans. Many Iraqis have been duped, the insurgents have no political program, and hence can be considered anarchists.

"They may manage to turn the tide against us and the government - that's what we have to watch against." Our political program is slow. "The metrics are good."

Low-ball number of [U.S.] troops is a problem. I watch the process with dismay. [Note: Kagan has not been to Iraq.] Very difficult for fights, great strain to seal borders, [fight] insurgents, train indigenous forces. All manpower intensive! Technology doesn't help much.

Bush is on the wrong path: As more Iraqi forces come on-line, you can eliminate some bad choices OR take out U.S. troops and leave more to the Iraqi government. Bush apparently wants to reduce U.S. forces.

Lastly: large Iraqi missions, not all complimentary. There is also the Global War on Terror, the mission to kill and capture terrorists. Iraqis less interested in that, won't pursue [as hard]. Apparently, we may have to maintain forces to track and kill these guys. [Isn't that what we're doing in Afghanistan?] Our number one priority is not to get troops out, or even stability, but security and the Global War on Terror.

Colonel Joe Anderson, XO to the Secretary of the Army and former brigade/regimental commander of the 101st Airborne division in Iraq and 1999 ground forces commander in Kosovo:

We're waging war in multiple places: Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans. I've made the 4B transition...

Challenges: when establishing priorities and objectives, commanders have strong influence -

[Aside: In other words, U.S. military commanders do have influence (in the sense that they are listened to) with their civilian bosses. Compare that to countries such as France, where military commanders, no matter what their rank, have no say in setting strategic policy. In these countries, there is no sure way to align policy with military means. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises an authority superior to his French counterpart; alternatively, the French Minister of Marine has greater authority than the U.S. Secretary of the Navy.]

- we have lots of elements to build and develop while balancing reconstruction. Difficult with war and theft.

Intel ops, civil affairs, communicate to people.

How much independence to give Iraqi security forces? When will they be able to do their mission?

Joost Hiltermann, Middle East project director at the International Crisis Group:

[Note: Usually, the AEI would seat a Democrat on the panel to provide an opposing view. However, after the event Mr. Donnelly complained it was difficult to find sensible Democrats nowadays. Hiltermann has actually been to post-war Iraq. In evaluating his words, I keep in my mind the possibility that Iraqis may say one thing to an American but something different to someone of a different nationality.]

For political stability, there are three ingredients:

1) Secure situation "can only be done gong-term by Iraqi forces, police not military, especially police intelligence." Their composition must not be on ethnic or secular lines - that would "aggravate the civil war."

2) economic reconstruction: "Not much at the moment" [Good lord, how many tax dollars has the U.S. poured into the country? By what standard does Hiltermann judge "not much", anyway? Rebuilding Europe's WWII-shattered cities took decades.] "Reconstruction should be [Iraqi?] labor intensive and address needs like electricity, water, & sanitation." [Isn't that what is happening now?]

3) Legitimate political process at the center. January elections were positive, but the results sectarian. We must now undo the consequences. [By now, it should be clear that Hiltermann is less a democrat at heart than a "power-sharing" socialist - include the leaders of the losing but violent minority in the power structure, forget about individual rights.] The Iraqi Constitution will only succeed if the process is "transparent, conclusive, and participatory". [Bull! If the process is completely open, how are politicians of different stripes supposed to cut deals?]

The fact that the Sunnis are part of the political process is positive. The process is being rushed by the Iraqi government and foreigners both. The philosophy is rationalized as follows: 1) Iraqis will haggle forever. 2) The timetable is important, as if it isn't met, insurgents will take heart.

This rationale is wrong-headed and should be rejected. No tangible participation by Iraqis [is taking place in the constitution-drafting] process. They can submit email or written suggestions [in some safe places]. Time is needed. August 1st is the deadline for extending the process, August 15th is the current deadline.

[Note: Colonel Anderson has been paying very close attention to this part of Hiltermann's speech.]

We will end up not with fully integrated document but an abbreviated one, with the "hard problems" postponed.

1) No rush to constitution - extend the process six months.
2) Encourage compromise, but not ?judgment?
3) Stay away from details, but Kirkuk should be made off-limits to Kurds.

[Whoa! Should it be enshrined in law that parts of London or Marseille be made off-limits to light-skinned people?]

Michael Rubin, a resident scholar at AEI and editor of the Middle East Quarterly, formerly Iran/Iraq advisor to the Secretary of Defense, and ex-CPA official:

"We call it insurgency, Iraqis call it terrorism. I would argue that the more we tolerate, the more reconciliation without truth -------, the more violence has occurred."

Iraqis followed [our qualification of de-Baathification] with increased violence. There is "psychological mistrust of how long we are willing to stay."

An Iraqi family may have "one son with U.S.-trained forces, and one son with the insurgents." This signals wider distrust of Americans. [Rumors of] a 2006 withdrawal will play to the "abandonment" fears of 1991.

"Perception in the mideast is 90% of reality."

Drive through Najaf & Kerbala, look at Alsant Al-Aqf [?] and its cartoons. One of them shows an American soldier trying to leave a compound labeled Iraq, but negotiating at a desk manned by insurgents.

The U.S. will be perceived as weak, not magnanimous, by leaving. We want to make sure people [know] power comes through the ballot box...there will be a referendum on the constitution.

"The Sunnis are not the liberal, secular folks in Iraq, contradicting the Western and Turkish press. (I see the Turkish press in the front row of the audience.)"

"By forcing the Sunnis in, we scorched the liberals [at] keeping the family law out of the courts."

"Any Iraqi politician who uses U.S. security officers will lose popularity, and Iraqis trust in him will be lost. If you talk to Iraqis, that's what they say."


"Don't change [the timetable, it will only take more time and permit] more underhandedness. "Iraqi politics is about brinksmanship." - you compromise after the deadlines.

"Yes, the Green Zone is isolated. But the committee is not drafting [the constitution] in isolation. The Sunni & Turcoman leadership is not clear, [but] the drafting committee is [a product of] political masters."

(By the way, the Western press doesn't report that the Dalai Lama has absolutely no legitimacy because he doesn't live in Tibet.)

"Don't squander the honeymoon. The biggest complaint is that "Americans keep changing the parameters" - heard from ex-Baathists and non-Baathists alike.

"Don't abet corruption." (Seen in the Kurdish north.) "Some NGOs are far from NGOs."

"There is too much patronage." For example, road repavings [in the Kurdish areas] "correspond to political loyalties for the past fourteen years."

This is not Beirut 1983 or Mogadishu 1993. Fulfilling promises important. If anything there are "too many diplomats" negotiating, not too many troops. [The civilians get less done than the] "CIRF[?] model".

Donnelly: "Any way you look at it...Iraqi politics and society are more broken than possible..."

There is "still a fundamental debate about the U.S. role once democracy is established."

Kagan: It is important to divorce the political from the terrorist struggle. "Very likely terrorism will continue after the development of the political process. The number of attacks per day is not a good metric..."

[I agree. Consider Michael Yon's report that recently-captured terrorists admitted that their stored "munitions were being readied for the next elections."]

It is "always a problem with a sovereign state if its leaders are protected by soldiers from another country.]

[Hey, it works for the Pope! And Karzai has U.S. bodyguards -- I haven't heard mention recently that the Afghans much care about that.]

***
Part IV: Q&A

Jordere Kayyum (Angola): What is this "withdrawal" Bush stuff?

Kagan: Nothing official yet, but there are public and private statements.

Donnelly: I want to draw Joe [Colonel Anderson] out on the stresses especially on the Army...This is OIF3. [Referring to year-rotations of Operation Iraqi Freedom.]

Col. Anderson: Planning assumption for this rotation and the next until told otherwise...Brigades become bigger with reserve components. Complicated, but there is a model.

Afghanistan is successful so far...I agree with the comment about police, they must be responsible and well-behaved.

Donnelly: I take that as deep doo-doo!

Q: How will the insurgency impede the U.S. [from acting against] countries not with the U.S.?

Col. Anderson: [We] will sustain [the current] effort. What force requirements estimate QDR is not part of a public forum. Hard to describe, we must have forces to go elsewhere. It is discussed every week [in the Pentagon].

Kagan: Understand that the U.S. can't fight two major wars, not since about 1993. It is disingenuous to say otherwise, we shouldn't maintain this myth.

[But it took the equivalent of only three divisions to oust Saddam Hussein.]

Stephen Solarz, formerly a Democrat congressional representative from New York: "We are paying a much higher price in blood and treasure than we anticipated. The American people will have to be persuaded that the benefits and consequences [are worth it]. From your perspective, what are the benefits of success as defined, and the consequences of failure?"

[Whoa! This is interesting. Why is Solarz, still a committed Democrat, here at all? Why didn't he operate through his buddies on Capitol Hill? I see no aides with him. I surmise that Solarz is exploring a new direction for the Democratic Party, but wants to keep this outside the normal political process. In other words, his question isn't a pose, it is for real!]

Rubin: "If we withdraw, there will be a massive spike in violence all over the world! This happened in 1993, to! Terrorism is used because it works!

Blood and treasure? Before the invasion [of Iraq, when we thought Saddam had WMDs, we] thought [the price] would be an order of magnitude higher. Outside the Beltway, Americans believe...

"[Go to the] Shiites in Samawa, [see] the mothers open their doors to the sight of long-lost but live sons, [that they thought dead in unknown graves] really is incredible! The people most against the war are those who don't talk to Iraqis.

"Like Alevi's [?] book, imposing an Arab Nationalism filter upon Iraqis. Iraqis have had thirty years of development [in a different direction]."

Kagan:...Consider the consequences of failure...Collapse creates the preconditions for terrorist training camps. Iraq's oil can fund democracy or warlords. It is unacceptable from a national security standpoint not to succeed. The consequences in Duluth would be enormous...forward to success.

Donnelly: "I agree, and add: We could withdraw from Vietnam and still win the Cold War. We can't withdraw from Iraq and [still] expand American power and ideals. The region is too important to walk away from.

A question for you, Mr. Solarz: the ideals and loyalties of Democrats are in question. How do your fellow Democrats feel? This [effort] must be sustained over decades and decades."

Solarz: "That's the question! The center of this battle is American public opinion -"

[Mr. Solarz is a politician. To a hammer, every problem looks like a nail.]

"- Republicans are reluctant to get organized against the Administration" but they will put re-election ahead of the administration. It is remarkable that no [substantial] anti-war movement has taken hold.

"This Administration has not brought Democrats into ply, like Roosevelt and Kennedy did -

[A peace offer! Solarz is actually implying that Democrats may change their policies if they are offered more power! If only the Dems had such credibility! Of course, during the conflicts of the previous administrations Solarz listed, at least the opposition party shared the goal of victory. Until proven otherwise, I submit that elected Democrats are - openly or secretly - wishing for defeat. That will give them one last crack at power before the terrorists strike us again.]

- [Bush] should have appointed a prominent Democrat to Baghdad. If not Bolton to the U.N., send a Democrat. If Rumsfeld goes, appoint a Democrat -

[Solarz easily slips back into the role of minority partisan, always begging for undeserved and unmerited power. All positions Solarz listed are those where a Democrat could essentially undermine the President's foreign policies yet heave all the blame onto Bush. Have we really seen anything constructive from the Democratic Party for years? Ever since Bush's re-election, they have stolen their motto from Nancy Reagan: "Just say NO!"]

Donnelly: I'd like Lieberman [D - Conn] as Secretary of Defense! How do we get the legislative branch more deeply involved?

Solarz: There are precedents, without relinquishing ...the Administration neglects at its own peril...it could influence a very significant portion..."

[Excuse me, but the realities of life in Washington intrude. I parked my car in the street. Time to feed the parking meter; ticketing in D.C. is very efficient. Once, I even caught a meter maid issuing me a ticket before the meter expired! "But it was about to!" she protested.]

[I returned in the middle of the summary arguments:]

Kagan: Iraqis working hard to ...to U.S. military...

Donnelly: Civilian side: privatization of civil ...., family/sectarian

Hiltermann: De-Batthification -, wrong mandate. Should have been de-Saddamization, not de-Ba'athification. "Keep people who never did harm to any body".

The Army was the institution least loyal to Saddam... I talked to several who joined the insurgency out of humiliation.

Ad-hoc -, not standard judiciary-based

Failure gives opportunity for personal scores and

Donnelly: Michael, let the de-Ba'athification issue go, and give us a report card on mechanisms.

Rubin: "Follow the money." Example: two fifth grade teachers of equal experience with a 10x discrepancy in salaries. The rich one did something to be complicit with the Baath regime. [We may not know what that something is.]

[Another example: Saddam's] press fixers can be charming, but that doesn't mean they have clean hands. Some people, like the deans of Mosul University, were irreedeemable, others incorruptible, some were incorruptible under Saddam but now are. The vetting process must be good.

How are Iraqis to get what we have? If not implemented, then Iraqis less able to maintain stability. [As an example,] take the contract to provide security at Baghdad airport to. The contract was extended just before the CPA left, [but that didn't ensure a mechinism for reviewing by the Iraqis.]

Part V: Schmooze

After the event adjourned, I thanked one or two speakers individually with questions and comments.

I tried to engage Mr. Rubin on the subject of corruption of government and misbehavior of Iraqi forces. I noted that much had been discussed about civilian control of the military but little of civilian control over the police. I cited civil contract issues in general and specifically the "soft" corruption reported by Michael Yon of the Iraqi police ("they quickly said goodbye, and melted off into the darkness with a duck under each arm") and the indiscriminate fire of the ING (I mistakenly referred to them as "police") reported by Ali.

Mr. Rubin responded defensively, asserting that corruption does exist, yes, but they're working on it. Furthermore, some of our approaches at contract work -- especially one praised by The New York Times in a Christmas Day, 2003 story, favoring tribal chieftains over others as "cultural sensitivity" - can make things worse.

What about accountability of elected officials between elections? Do the Iraqis have public town meetings on big public projects? Mr. Rubin asserted that they did.

With the reporter from Al-Hurra listening, I then spoke to Mr. Kagan about my primary interest, U.S. troop levels in Iraq in general and the purpose of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Mr. Kagan believes it was a mistake to use so few troops; that created an opening for the "insurgency".

"Isn't that desirable?" I asked. "The "self-selected" fanatics can pour into Iraq to be killed, rather than attack us at home. Wouldn't a half-million troops, as we deployed in 1991, discourage that? And the sort of democracy established, wouldn't that be carrying Iraqis on a litter, as we carry Germany to this day?"

Mr. Kagan: The U.S. and its allies deployed 650,000 troops in 1991. I don't think even a half-million troops would prevent the insurgency" - but would help defeat it more quickly, and discourage the further efforts.

"What is the purpose of the Iraq War?" I asked.

"To establish Iraq as a republican democracy", Mr. Kagan replied.

"Then what of the Global War on Terror?"

"On balance, I think establishing democracy in Iraq is more important."

I believe the two should proceed together - combined Iraqi and U.S. forces will win the battle for Iraq. But Mr. Kagan asserts that as Iraq develops politically, it will veer away from U.S. interests at attacking all terrorists, and Iraqis will be less interested in pursuing those terrorists who remain in the country, but do not threaten Iraqis directly. I pointed out the success of operations in Afghanistan; U.S. forces operate against terrorists freely there without impeding Afghan development. Kagan parried that the Taliban attacks are now increasing once again.

Mr. Kagan and I both agreed that it was remarkable that Mr. Solarz showed up at all. Why not work through his committee contacts on Capitol Hill? We noted that Solarz had omitted from his historical examples of constructive Congressional war activities Senator Harry Truman's excellent committee work exposing military waste.

We disagreed on the usefulness of the Civil War era Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. I'll defend it to anybody, Kagan asserted. Hmm. One cannot dismiss the opinion of a scholar like Kagan lightly. Until I review my materials and check out one or two new ones, I must assume that Kagan is correct and I am in error.

An Arab-looking NGO officer with an Irish brogue explained her situation in Iraq to Col. Anderson: they were all set to go in her city, but the U.S. commander needed some $10 million for the infrastructure project, and it hasn't come out of the civilian administration: ("On the whole, I think the CPA was corrupt and a waste" was one of her lines.) Anderson responded that U.S. generals simply don't have that kind of money for projects. It's got to go through the process. And how, Colonel Anderson asked, did an NGO officer from South Asia develop an Irish accent?

"My parents wanted me to have a moral education, so they sent me to an Irish seminary. Should I try to eliminate the accent?"

Colonel "Joe" chuckled. "No!" I interjected. "At least you don't talk through your nose like me!"

"I've been trying to place it," the NGO officer said. "Are you from New York?"

"No, I'm a native."

Still smiling, Joe addressed the NGO officer: "Your accent is fine. You meet all sorts of people in this work." Adding a few polite goodbyes, Colonel Joseph Anderson, Executive Officer to the Secretary of the United States Army, turned smoothly in his government-issue desert combat boots and departed.

Beyond Iraq in the Global War on Terror: The Saudi Connection

- Is the War on Terror over, then? Do we leave Iraq?

No and no. We remain in Iraq as we continue working on the next stage of the GWOT. Iraq isn't the only front in the GWOT...

- Where next in the War on Terror? The Israeli/Palestinian dispute? That's how all the terrorism started, right?

I don't think we can "solve" the Israeli/Palestinian dispute by itself. Over seventy years, all efforts to solve it directly have failed. That suggests that Israeli/Palestinian dispute is only the visible hand or battlefield of a much larger conflict.

- "The Clash of Civilizations"? The West vs. Islam, then?

Not quite. Islam comes in different varieties. I don't think it began with the Zionists, or the Palestinian problem, or Iraq. I think it began with Saudi Arabia.

- What blather is this?

"Saudi" Arabia exists because the Saudis allied with the previously obscure Wahhabi sect of Islam to conquer Arabia’s then-ruling family, the Hashmiates. In the beginning, Wahhabism was just a small and violent sect. It's main emphasis is that all Muslims must be judged by how they advance Islamic power through war, through jihad. The Saudis completed their conquest of Arabia in 1919.

- Then why hasn't Saudi Arabia been at war with the West since then?

Because the Saudi family is smart; they knew from the start they could not confront the West directly. Immediately after the conquest of Arabia some hotheads in their army attacked the British who had just conquered the Ottoman provinces that would become Iraq and Kuwait. The Saudis wouldn't permit that.

- Why not?

Can you imagine raiders equipped mostly with bolt-action rifles up against trained troops backed by tanks and aircraft? The Saudis knew their rule could not possibly endure under such circumstances. After the British responded to Arab raids with air attacks, the Saudis decided to machine-gun their own troops.

- They killed their own army?

After it had won the Saudi Family supreme power in the Arabian Peninsula, yes. The Brits let the Saudis stay in power. An unstable balance of power between Wahhabi imams and Saudi "moderates" has existed ever since.

- Why would the Wahhabi imams accept this?

Because the Saudis can point to overwhelming Western military power to argue that jihad can best be waged indirectly. The Saudis could buy off Wahhabi hostility through bribes at home and funding the Arabs of Palestine to revolt against British and Israeli rule. For years, such activities represented the limit of Saudi resources - they were dependent on Western technological expertise and the population was still small...

- Why is the population of Saudi Arabia an issue?

The Saudis tried to keep as much of their oil money to themselves as possible and let their subject population exist via subsistence agriculture, trading, or tourism. Other than oil, Saudi Arabia has few resources, and its desert offers few opportunities for agriculture; at first, the Arabs only permitted oil exploration as an adjunct to drilling water wells! With agriculture in the dumps and modern medical care practically non-existent, the population of Saudi Arabia remained small, despite a high birth rate.

A small, poor population necessarily puts a severe limit upon how much power a ruler can exert abroad. In the Sixties, people everywhere worried about population control. That included the Islamic World. The Rabat First Islamic Conference on Family Planning in 1972 ruled that save for abortion and sterilization, modern birth control techniques are not contrary to Islamic Law.

- Then what happened?

First, the 1973 oil crisis vastly increased Saudi Arabia's economic power, in the form of vast amounts of "petrodollars" that could be spent or transferred with impunity, thus disrupting entire economies. Second, the Saudi King Faisal was assassinated by one of his nephews in March, 1975.

- So?

I do not know why the King was assassinated, but maybe it was because the Wahhabis believed that he was not putting new Saudi financial muscle to use. Within a month of the assassination, birth control was banned in Saudi Arabia, then ruled illegal by the World Muslim League. Sometimes aided by oil-funded Western fertility drugs, the Arab population - especially Saudi and Palestinian components - have been exploding ever since.

- Again, so what?

Historians and even economists understand there is a connection between the size and population density of young males and their culture's warlike tendencies. As children, boys tend to form gangs and fight each other. By adolescence, their adult leaders are poised to use this aggression and experience against external enemies. (This was one of the reasons why the first Muslim armies were so effective; they had great experience fighting one another; united and experienced, they could subdue the less-united and experienced Persians and Byzantines.)

- Hey! I recall some Iraqis have written about how Islamists in Basra encouraged the formation of warlike rival gangs.

Yes, this process still exists today. With huge levels of unemployment due to underdevelopment, young Saudis, Palestinians, and other Arabs have few opportunities to make something of their lives.

- The Intifada! I remember reading it began when a group of kids started throwing stones at Israelis instead of each other! And by the mid-1990s we saw the emergence of Al-Qaeda!

It started before that, in Afghanistan, but yes; that's the connection: Al-Qaeda is the Wahhabi army, an product of an invader mentality multiplied by an exploding population. The "Intifadas" of Palestinian Arabs against Israel are a parallel development driven by exterior support, a kind of blind to Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi activities -

- Which is why direct efforts to solve "the Mideast peace process" have failed!

Exactly! The Saudis encouraged, funded, and tolerated Al-Qaeda until, frustrated by the United States abroad yet under the thumb of their rulers at home, Al-Qaeda started turning against the House of Saud. The Palestinian terrorists now have many supporters...

- Then Al-Qaeda is dead!?

The branch of Al-Qaeda devoted to destroying the House of Saud is probably destroyed. But the threat of unrestrained Islamic terrorism against secular democracy remains.

- So do we invade Saudi Arabia after all?

[to be continued...]

[This post is the second part of a series. Read the first part: Why is the U.S. STILL in Iraq?]

Why is the U.S. STILL in Iraq?

[PART I of the Global War on Terror - The Year in Review]

- Why are we STILL in Iraq?

To finish the job and move on.

- What does that mean? People are still dying horribly over there! You were wrong - the end of the Coalition Authority didn't mean an end to the insurgency.

Don't call it an "insurgency". It's a guerilla.

- Then why doesn't anybody call them that?

Under the 1977 protocol of the Geneva Convention -- a protocol not ratified by the U.S. -- guerillas have prisoner-of-war rights. So coalition forces don't use the term. People also believe "guerillas" must be natives, so the Iraqis don't like it, either. The press won't use the term because--

- because "Guerilla" sounds too much like "gorilla", right?

Maybe. It's true that the July-to-January period was marked by violence. But by "soiling their own nest" the terrorists lost more support among the Iraqi people. It was the Iraqi election itself the took much of the wind out of the terrorists, as each side realized the true will of the Iraqi people and measured each other's military strength.

- What do you mean?

One can assume that the terrorists left nothing in reserve and made a maximum effort to disrupt the January elections. In other words, they all came out of hiding to fight. That's how the number of estimated terrorists dropped from 20,000 to 3,500. Voter turnout was high, except for those areas plagued by terrorists or former Ba'athist strongholds. It is just as I wrote last year: those Iraqis who believe in democracy are those who don't want any more Saddams. The "domestic" component of the terrorists are organized and funded by the ex-Ba'athists. Most (not all) of the radical Islamic component comes from abroad, from Al-Qaeda. The Shiite majority never wanted Saddam back and even the radical Shias are part of the democratic process now.

- Do we have Iran to thank for that?

I don't think so; the Iraqi Shiite leadership assures us of their independence. They tell us they seek to build their leadership from the Iraqi Najaf school of Shiite thinking, rather than the Iranian Qom school of Shiite thought. That means, apparently, "Hands off!" - Direct involvement in secular affairs is not appropriate for the clergy, not if the secular government is truly representative.

- That sounds just like the American approach!

Not quite. The final shape of the Iraqi constitution is still being debated -- the political process I envisioned as occurring six months ago is happening now -- but one thing seems clear: Iraqis will never see their political candidates officially vetted by Muslim clergy the way Iranians do.

- What does the U.S. do next in Iraq?

With the formation of a new and democratic Iraqi government, it is important to "wrap up" the guerilla quickly, so the new government gains legitimacy. That is the purpose of our recent ferocious offensives near Al-Qaim, around Baghdad, and elsewhere: combined coalition and Iraqi forces are destroying the organized "insurgency". Doubtless, there will still be individual terrorist acts, but we will deny them even a clan-level base of population support anywhere in Iraq to pursue their murderous ends.

- Clan level?

Many Iraqis give their loyalty to their family first, then the clan, the tribe, their religious affiliation, and finally the nation. Saddam used this system to great effect; everyone in it is motivated to remain loyal and thus it is an efficient means to keep secrets and wield power. Early on, we discovered many terrorists or their supporters are also organized by the family clan system, many of them criminals and smugglers.

- How can we beat this clan system?

Such a system has unique weaknesses as well as strengths. For example, all of Saddam's close bodyguards were from just a few clans. Once we knew who these clans were, it was only a matter of time before we had Saddam himself. Defeat the criminal clans and the terrorists hiding with them, and you defeat the guerilla. What's left will more closely resemble the Baader-Meinhof gang than the Khmer Rouge of the 1980s.

- Why is the insurgency still fighting, then? Look at all those bombs!

As the terrorists lose support, their terror is not directed less at us, and more at the Iraqis themselves. The guerillas wish to expand their base beyond the few clans that are supporting them. They are trying to do so by terrorizing the populace.

- So the attacks are part of a grand recruitment drive?

Yes. That's how the Ba'athists rose to power in the first place. But we will defeat them. Iraqis realize that now and are cooperating with Iraqi & coalition forces as never before. They never wish to see Ba'athist rule ever again, and the Sunni population is losing its fears of cooperating with the Shia- and Kurd- led government. After the next election, Iraqi Sunnis will be part of the democratic process; terrorists won't hold them back.

- You say we are finishing up the insurgency in Iraq now. Why didn't we do that months, even years ago? Why didn't we go in stronger, and establish Iraq as a safe democracy right away? And why didn't we say right from the first that our purpose was to bring democracy to the Iraqi people, rather than eliminate Saddam's non-existent weapons of mass destruction?

[sigh] We didn't liberate - and that's the correct term, make no mistake - Iraq out of wholly altruistic reasons. We had purposes of our own.

First, we know - and the Kurds won't let anyone forget - that Saddam had WMDs in the past. He had ceased cooperating with the U.N. in its efforts to root them out. Saddam was openly and actively funding terrorism elsewhere in the world. So it was easy to imagine Saddam cooperating with terrorists to the extent of giving them a nuke or deadly germ or nerve poison, just to keep his own skin intact a little longer. There may still be some hidden away, but the power to employ them is gone.

Second, of all the nasty regimes out there, Saddam's was the most vulnerable. All of his neighbors bore grudges, most of them wanted him dead or out of power, and surveillance established just how weak his armies' were in training, national defense, and morale.

Third, just suppose we had invaded Iraq with a half-million-man army like that which we used to kick Saddam out of Kuwait in 1990. We might have succeeded in establishing stability immediately, yet we would have failed to help reform an Arab society to desire, of its own accord, democracy in preference to secular or religious dictatorship. The heavy hand of such an occupation might serve to generate a real insurgency, which would be suppressed by U.S. forces -- not Iraqi troops -- and thus create additional resentment against the U.S. in the population. Iraq would be dependent upon such an occupying army for years or decades.

Fourth, terrorists attack when they sense weakness, not strength. Had we established a strong occupation we might have spared Iraqis much suffering, yet we would have failed to entice the terrorists away from plans to strike on U.S. soil. It would be almost the same as if the U.S. had never invaded Iraq at all.

Finally, if we had emphasized our central purpose was the establishment of Iraqi democracy - though we always listed it as one of our purposes - our support would have been diminished and the invasion would likely never have happened. For we would never have had the support of many of our Arab allies to host U.S. troops in the first place; none of them is a democracy. Furthermore, we would have been accused of hypocrisy: why does the U.S. want to invade an Arab country to establish democracy instead of invading Zimbabwe, Cuba, or Uzbekistan? Admitting we invaded for the purpose of establishing democracy would not have earned us any brownie points with the lefty crowd, or with the Europeans; they would always be searching for an ulterior motive. And because rebuilding Iraq would be certain to involve Western businesses in one form or the other, they would always be able to find one.

- You don't think the U.S. has made any big mistakes in Iraq at all, do you?

I do not. What could we have done differently, and to serve what purposes? So far the Iraq-as-flypaper strategy has worked, though the cost is high for Iraqi soldiers and civilians. When Osama Bin-Laden sent out a call recently for his lieutenant, Zarqawi, to attack the U.S., it seems the response was that doing so was currently impractical, as the supply of martyrs available was much smaller than a few years ago.

As of today, U.S. troops, many deployed in enticingly un-armored Humvees and thin-skinned trucks, have slaughtered terrorists at a ratio of perhaps thirty-to-one. That is my conservative best guess, given the news reports from Fallujah and Al-Qaim.

The human cost, so far, has been eighteen hundred troops dead, and over ten thousand wounded. The human benefit has been the liberation of some twenty-five million souls.

Let us respect our dead soldiers, and consider the great sacrifices they made for our freedom, on this Memorial Day.

[continued in Part II, Beyond Iraq in the Global War on Terror: The Saudi Connection. This post is an anniversary review of a previous article, Why is the U.S. in Iraq?]

[Updated 4:45pm to insert a missing paragraph.]

The Global War on Terror at Home

Another small plane loses its way over the Washington area and fighter jets scramble to intercept. Noisy. Bits of flares in my back yard.

Reminds me of a day twenty-five years ago when the windows of my home shook: one of my neighbors, a former Iranian diplomat, shot by a phony postman. The assassin fled to Iran to become a movie star -- experience, I suppose.

You see, I was never one of those people who thought the GWOT began on September 11th, 2001. It's just that this was the day we Americans started to fight back. Better the screech of fighter jets and the glare of flares than the death rattles and toasted bodies of terrorists' victims.

Many years ago, long before the GWOT, police at Dulles airport noticed a man acting suspiciously; he was obviously agitated by the heavy paper bag he was holding. something he had just been given by a passing acquaintance. He dumped it in the garbage and fled. The cops called the bomb squad. The bomb squad gingerly took the package out onto the field and detonated it. They examined the remains carefully and determined they had blown up a box of fudge.

Thanks to the U.S. military, I no longer experience a sense of helplessness and impending doom when I look up at the sky, even if there is a plane out there with my name on it. If the errant small plane overhead yesterday had been shot down, I don't think I would have felt any different.

Perhaps the terrorists will strike the U.S. again, and we civilians will once more share the dangers of our troops abroad. (The last time that happened was two years ago, when the Washington-area snipers were on the prowl. One of their "kills" was the mother of a child at the elementary school across the street.) Such events don't diminish my respect for our troops or the GWOT one inch.

Check out this post at The New Sisyphus:

The Future of Public Diplomacy: Cutting Out the Middleman:

Our current PD program focuses on one thing and one thing only: the press...our entire system is staked on one central theme: that there is no more important conduit to the public of host countries than that country’s press or, in the unique case of the Middle East, in the trans-national satellite channels like Al-Jazeera. But what if that central judgment is incorrect?

I was going to post on this subject, but now I don't have to -- or at least, I won't have to write so much!

Captain Zarqawi Hook, the World's Most Famous Crook!

I don't think most Westerners realize that the terrorists' current targets are ordinary Iraqis because the terrorists need recruits. Consider the animated Disney classic Peter Pan as a metaphor of current events in Iraq. (Although Zarqawi and the Ba'athists aren't nearly as brave characters as Captain Hook.) At one point, Captain Hook and his pirates capture the children and Lost Boys and attempt to press them into his service:

So, Try the life of a thief,
Just sample the life of a crook.
There isn't a boy
Who won't enjoy
A-workin' for Captain Hook.
The World's Most Famous Crook!

As a special offer for today,
I'll tell you what I'll do.
All those who sign without delay,
Will get a free tattoo.
Why, it's like money in the bank,
C'mon, join up, and I'll be frank:
Unless you do, you'll walk the plank!
The choice is up to you

The choice is up to you.

Yo-ho, Yo-ho, Yo-ho, Yo-ho, Yo-ho!
You'll love the life of a thief,
You'll relish the life of a crook.
There's barrels of fun enough for ev'ryone,
And you'll get treasures by the ton!

So come and sign the book.
Join up with Captain Hook!

Iraqis today learn from one of their television programs, "Terrorism in the Grip of Justice", just the sort of people they are up against: criminals and those who are in their grip. Kidnaping Iraqis and foreigners for ransom is certainly a profitable criminal activity. Threatening ordinary Iraqis with bombs and assassination may be persuasive: join us and make crime your career or die now!

So, why don't the boys sign up with Captain Hook? Well, at first they rush to do so, but stop when their "mother/sister" Wendy points out that this is a shameful activity and holds out that Peter Pan -- the strong, naiive, flighty, superficial boy-hero (an American, of course!) -- will save them. Wendy is the first to walk the plank.

Perhaps, like Wendy, Iraqi women are (or can be) the real moral strength of their people? This writer doesn't know. But for those who may still feel coerced towards a life of crime, consider the lyrics sung by the pirates themselves:

A pirate's life is a wonderful life
You'll find adventure and sport
But live every minute
For all that is in it
The life of a pirate is short.

(The Elegant Captain Hook Music by Sammy Fain. Lyrics by Sammy Cahn.)

Taking Hezbollah at its Word

"[Hezbollah] will not disarm even if the Israelis withdraw from Shebaa Farms...Hezbollah's arms are here to protect Lebanon from any Israeli attack and create a balance of terror in the face of Israel."

All right, then. Perhaps the Lebanese should not view this as defiance, but as a statement of support. As Hezbollah is now defining itself as purely a protect-Lebanon-from-external-threat operation, Lebanon can now ask Hezbollah to integrate its forces with the Lebanese Army, under Army command.

In what better way can such a mission be performed? And if Hezbollah's leaders refuse, exactly why should any Lebanese still follow them?